

ARTS 6002 Advanced Studies in the Humanities:

Personal Identity

Course Outline

Time : Thu 2:30pm-5:15pm	Location:	TBC
---------------------------------	------------------	------------

Course overview

The lecture focusses on two main topics, which are intended to shed light on each other with regard to their prerequisites and conditions: On the one hand, the intrinsic structures of historical and systematic approaches to discourse will be presented and discussed with regard to their respective forms of thought; on the other hand, this will be approached with a view to non-European concepts of philosophy. It is therefore not a question of comparing so-called European-Western and non-European thought, which would be too simple anyway and would also encourage certain stereotypes such as "East and West" or "West versus East". Nevertheless, the focus of the lecture will be on the intercultural relevance of philosophical forms of thought, even if these may have been decidedly Western or Eastern at the time of their emergence. Only in the course of the globally active history of thought did it become increasingly clear that and how we owe it to each other to recognise and acknowledge the respective other sides, also in order to prevent our own hegemonic ambitions.

Learning outcomes (as shown on CUSIS)

1. Understand the historical and cultural conditions of forms of thought.
2. Grasp the role of forms of language for thinking.
3. Develop a critical view on the role of conceptual frameworks.
4. Grasp the potential of ways of thinking in promoting intercultural understanding.
5. Develop students' ability to research independently on the issues taught.

Topics

Personal identity: What can become of us?

What are persons, what changes can persons undergo, most importantly for most people, can they survive bodily death. If so how? The module will be historically focused, looking at the seminal writings of John Locke but also surveying the contemporary debates, which interact with recent ideas about survival as a non-human. If you and another person had your brains swapped, would you have swapped bodies? Or should we say that you still exist in your old body, only now your memories, beliefs, personality traits, etc. are different? Would you survive teleportation? What if teleporting worked by recording your body state, destroying your body, and then creating a copy of it elsewhere? Would this copy be morally responsible for your crimes? What if the teleporter created two copies? These puzzles raise the issue of what your continued existence consists of - are you essentially a brain, a soul, a body, a set of mental states, or something else? These are the sorts of issue we will examine in this course

Learning activities

The course aims to be both a "research lecture" and a "discussion lecture". It will consist of prepared inputs by the teacher as well as presentations by the students, based on the texts supplied. Adjustments can

be made according to the needs of the students.

Assessment scheme as prescribed on CUSIS (revise if necessary)

<i>Task nature</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Weight</i>
Reading response	At home (700-1000 words in English; due 24 October before lecture, by email).	20%
Term paper	At home (1800-2300 words in English; due 5 December by 5 pm, by email)	50%
In-class activities and discussion	See below	30%

Remarks on Assessment Scheme (if any)

Reading response (20%). Each student is expected to write an original reading response in which they accomplish two main tasks. The first task is to present a single argument, objection, problem, or proposed solution to a problem discussed in one of the weeks 1 – 8 readings. This should not be a summary of the reading as a whole. The second task is to provide a response to that argument, objection, etc. This should take the form of a single critical claim (a claim in which the writer states whether they agree or disagree, poses an objection or major worry, observes a surprising implication, etc.) followed by a short defense of that critical claim (an argument). The claim in question should not be sociological or exegetical. (The reading response should also begin with a short introductory paragraph in which the writer says what they'll focus on and what their critical claim will be.) The reading response should be 700 – 1000 words in English (inclusive of footnotes), and it should be emailed (as a Word document, with English-language font) before lecture time on 24 October. (Please title the subject of your email “ARTS6002 reading response”, and please title the attached term paper file “[YOUR SURNAME, your given name] ARTS6002 reading response”.) Please adhere to the deadline and to the word count requirement. Note that the penalties for lateness and for failing to meet the word count requirement are the same as for the term paper (as written below). Please note also that any use of AI software is strictly prohibited and will be considered plagiarism.

Term paper (50%). Each student is expected to write an original paper in which they state and defend a substantial philosophical thesis on a topic related to the issues discussed in this course. (The claim should not be sociological or exegetical.) The term paper topic proposal should be submitted over email before the week 10 (7 November) lecture. (You are encouraged to submit the proposal earlier, in case it is not immediately approved.) The paper should be 1800 – 2300 words in English (inclusive of footnotes but not the bibliography), and it should be emailed (as a Word document, with English-language font) by 5 p.m. on 5 December. (Please title the subject of your email “PHIL6002 term paper”, and please title the attached term paper file “[YOUR SURNAME, your given name] ARTS6002 term paper”.) Please adhere to the deadline and to the word count requirement. If the paper is late, an initial penalty of 1/3rd of a letter grade will be applied; an additional penalty of 1/3rd of a letter grade will then be applied for each additional 24-hour period before the paper is submitted. Similarly, for every 100 words over or under the word count, a penalty of 1/3rd of a letter grade will be applied. Please note that any use of AI software is strictly prohibited and will be considered plagiarism.

In-class activities and discussion (30%). The activities/exercises involved in this will be determined once the overall class size is known. Activities/exercises may involve presentations, quizzes, small-group collaborative work, and/or organized debates (in addition to class discussion). (Please note that, because attendance is required in order for one to participate in these activities, each unexcused absence will result in a letter-grade deduction to one's in-class activities and discussion score.)

Grade Descriptor

Please refer to: http://phil.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/~phidept/UG/Grade_descriptors.pdf

Recommended learning resources

- Butler, Joseph. 'Of Personal Identity', 1st appendix/dissertation to Butler's *The Analogy of Religion*, 1736. Reprinted in *Personal Identity*, ed. John Perry, Berkeley: University of California, 1975.
- Campbell, Scott. 2006. 'The Conception of a Person as A Series of Mental Events', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 73(2), Sep 2006, pp. 339-358.
- Dancy, Jonathan, ed. 1997. *Reading Parfit*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
- Dewitt, Larry W. 1975. 'Consciousness, Mind, and Self: The Implications of the Split-Brain Studies', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 26, pp. 41-7.
- Garrett, Brian. 1991. 'Personal Identity and Reductionism', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 51, pp. 361-73.
- Hershenov, David. 2005. 'Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity?', *Mind* 114 (453), pp. 31-59.
- Johansson, Jens. 2009. 'Am I A Series?', *Theoria* 75 (3), pp. 196-205.
- Kitcher, Patricia. 1977. 'Being Selfish About Your Future', *Philosophical Studies* 32 (4) Nov, pp. 425-31.
- Kolak, Daniel. 1993. 'The Metaphysics and Metapsychology of Personal Identity - Why Thought Experiments Matter in Deciding Who We Are', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 30 (1), pp. 39-50.
- Lewis, David. 1971. 'Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies', *Journal of Philosophy* 68, 203-11. Reprinted in his *Philosophical Papers Vol. I*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 47-54.
- Lewis, David. 1976. 'Survival and Identity', in *The Identities of Persons*, ed. A. O. Rorty, Berkeley: University of California, pp. 17-40. Reprinted in his *Philosophical Papers Vol. I*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, David. 1983. Postscript to "Survival and Identity", in *Philosophical Papers Vol. I*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 73-77.
- Lewis, D. (1986) *On The Plurality of Worlds*, Oxford: Blackwell
- Locke, J. 1690 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, , chapter XXVII.
- Mackie, D.. 1998. 'Going Topless', *Ratio* 11 (2), pp. 125-140.
- Mackie, D. 1999. 'Animalism Versus Lockeanism: No Contest', *Philosophical Quarterly* 49 (196), pp. 369-76.
- Mackie, D.. 1999. 'Personal Identity and Dead People', *Philosophical Studies* 95 (3), September, pp. 219-42.
- Mackie, P. 2008. 'Coincidence and Identity', *Philosophy* 83, pp. 151-76.
- Madden, R. 2016. 'Human Persistence' *Philosophers' Imprint*
- Margolis, J.. 1975. 'Puccetti on Brains, Minds and Persons', *Philosophy of Science* 42 (3), pp. 275-80.
- Martin, C.B, and Deutscher, Max 1966. 'Remembering', *Philosophical Review* 75 (2), April, pp. 161-196.
- Martin, R. and Barresi, J. eds. *Personal Identity*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
- Martin, Raymond. 1987. 'Memory, Connecting and What Matters in Survival', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 65 (1), pp. 82-97.
- Martin, Raymond. 1995. 'Fission Rejuvenation', *Philosophical Studies* 80 (1), pp. 17-40.
- Michael B. Burke. 1992. 'Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account', *Analysis* 52 (1), pp. 12-17.
- Nagel, Thomas. 1971. 'Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness', *Synthese* XXII, pp. 396-413.
- Noonan, Harold, ed. 1993. *Identity*, Dartmouth: Aldershot.
- Noonan, Harold 2019 *Personal Identity*, 3rd edition, London: Routledge.
- Nozick, Robert.,1981. 'The Identity of the Self', chapter 1 of *Philosophical Explanations*, Oxford: Clarendon
- Olson, Eric. 1994. 'Is Psychology Relevant to Personal Identity?', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 72 (2), pp. 173-86.
- Olson E. 1994. 'Human People and Human Animals', *Philosophical Studies* 80, 159-1997.
- Olson, Eric. 1994. 'Human People and Human Animals', *Philosophical Studies* 80, 159-81.
- Olson, E. 1997 *The Human Animal*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Olson, Eric. 2001. 'Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem', *Philosophical Quarterly* 51, 337-355.
- Olson, Eric. 2004. 'Animalism and the Corpse Problem', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 82, pp. 265-74.
- Olson, Eric. 2007. *What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Parfit, Derek. 1971. 'Personal Identity', *Philosophical Review* 80 (1), pp. 3-27; reprinted in *The Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Jonathan Glover, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, pp. 142-62.
- Parfit, Derek. 1976 'Lewis, Perry and What Matters', in *The Identities of Persons*, ed. Amelie Rorty, Berkeley: University of California, pp. 91-6.
- Parfit, D. 1987 *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford: Clarendon, rev. ed., 1987 (1984 and 1986) Parfit, Derek. 1993. 'The Indeterminacy of Identity: A Reply to Brueckner', *Philosophical Studies* 70, pp. 23-33.

- Parfit, Derek. 1995. 'The Unimportance of Identity', in *Identity*, ed. Henry Harris, Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 13-45.
- Perry, J. 1975. *Personal Identity*, ed., Berkeley: University of California.
- Perry, J. 1976. 'The Importance of Being Identical', in Rorty, Amelie Oskenberg, *The Identities of Persons*, ed., Berkeley: University of California, 1976, pp. 67-90.
- Perry, J. 1976. Review of Williams' *Problems of the Self*, *Journal of Philosophy*, LXXIII, pp. 416-28.
- Puccetti, R.. 1973. 'Brain Bisection and Personal Identity', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 24, pp. 339-55.
- Puccetti, Roland. 1976. 'The Mute Self: A Reaction to Dewitt's Alternative Account of the Split-Brain Data', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 27, pp. 65-73
- Puccetti, R. 1980. 'On Saving Our Concept of a Person', *Philosophy* 55 (213), July, pp. 403-407.
- Reid, Thomas. 'Of Mr. Locke's Account of Our Personal Identity', chapter 6 of 'Of Memory', 3rd essay in Reid's *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, 1785. Reprinted in *Personal Identity*, ed. John Perry, Berkeley: University of California, 1975.
- Roache, Rebecca. 2006. 'A Defence of Quasi-Memory', *Philosophy* 81, pp. 323-55.
- Robinson, Daniel. 1976. 'What Sort of Persons are Hemispheres? Another Look at "Split-Brain" Man', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 27, pp. 73-8.
- Robinson, Denis. 1985. 'Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 63 (3), pp. 299-319.
- Rorty, Amelie Oskenberg. 1976. *The Identities of Persons*, ed., Berkeley: University of California.
- Schechtman, Marya. 1990. 'Personhood and Personal Identity', *The Journal of Philosophy* 87 (2), February, pp. 71-92.
- Shoemaker, S. and Swinburne, R.. 1984. *Personal Identity*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Shoemaker, S. 1963 *Self-Knowledge and Self-identity*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press
- Shoemaker, Sydney. 1970. 'Persons and their Pasts', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 7 (4), pp. 269-85.
- Shoemaker, Sydney. 1997. 'Self and Substance', in *Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. James Tomberlin, supplement to *Nous* 1997, pp. 283-304
- Shoemaker, Sydney, 2008. 'Persons, Animals and Identity', *Synthese* 162, pp. 313-24.
- Shoemaker S. 2016 'Thinking animals without animalism' in S. Blatti and P. Snowdon (eds.) *Animalism: New Essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Sider, T.. 1996. "All the World's A Stage", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74, pp. 433-53.
- Stone, Jim. 1998. 'Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are No People', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* XLVIII (ie. v.48), No.3, March, pp. 519-32.
- Stone, J. 2005 'Why There are Still No People', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70 (1) Jan., pp. 174-192.
- Thomson, Judith Jarvis 1997. 'People and Their Bodies', in *Reading Parfit*, ed. Jonathan Dancy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 202-29.
- Unger, Peter. 'Fission and the Focus of One's Life', Ch. 6 of *Personal Identity*, ed. Raymond Martin and John Barresi, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Unger, Peter. 1979. 'I Do Not Exist', in *Perception and Identity*, ed. G. F. Macdonald, Ithica: Cornell, pp. 235-51.
- van Inwagen, Peter. 1997. 'Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity', in *Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. James Tomberlin, supplement to *Nous* 1997, pp. 305-19.
- Whiting, Jennifer. 1986. 'Friends and Future Selves', *Philosophical Review* 95 (4), pp. 547-80.
- Wilkes, Kathleen. 1978. 'Consciousness and Commissurotomy', *Philosophy* 53, pp. 185-99.
- Williams, B. 1957. 'Personal Identity and Individuation', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* New Series v. 57, pp. 229-52; reprinted in Bernard Williams' *Problems of the Self*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 1-18.
- Williams, B. 1960. 'Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity', *Analysis* 21 (2), pp. 43-8; reprinted in Bernard Williams *Problems of the Self*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 19-25.
- Williams, B. 'The Self and the Future', *The Philosophical Review* LXXIX, 1970. Reprinted in *The Philosophy of Mind*, ed. J. Glover, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 126-41, and in Williams' *Problems of the Self*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1973.
- Wollheim, Richard. 1984. *The Thread of Life*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.

Course schedule

<i>Week</i>	<i>Topics</i>	<i>Teaching Mode</i> <i>Online / in-campus</i>	<i>Required reading</i>	<i>Tutorials</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1	Introduction	in-campus	Olson, E. 'Personal Identity' <i>Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy</i> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/		
2	Locke: the Psychological account	in-campus	Locke, J. (1961) <i>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</i> , ed. J. Yolton, London: Dent, Book 2, Ch. 27		
3	Responses to Locke	in-campus	Noonan, H. (2019) <i>Personal Identity</i> London: Routledge, Ch. 3		
4	Psychological Theories and Causation	in-campus	Shoemaker, S. (1970) 'Persons and their pasts', <i>American Philosophical Quarterly</i> 7: 269-85.		
5	Reductionism and Indeterminacy	in-campus	Parfit, D. (1971) 'Personal identity', <i>Philosophical Review</i> 80: 3-		
6	Parfit and what matters and teletransportation	in-campus	Parfit, D. (1984) <i>Reasons and Persons</i> , Oxford: Clarendon Press, Part 3, Chs. 10-11.		
7	Parfit and what matters and split brains	in-campus	Parfit, D. (1984) <i>Reasons and Persons</i> , Oxford: Clarendon Press, Part 3, Ch. 12		
8	Parfit and The Reduplication Problem and the Only x and y Principle	in-campus	Noonan, H. (2019) <i>Personal Identity</i> London: Routledge, Ch. 7		
9	Physical Theories of Personal Identity	in-campus	Olson, E. (1997) <i>The Human Animal: Personal Identity</i>		

			<i>without Psychology</i> , Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chs. 1-2		
10	Animalism continued	in-campus	Shoemaker, S. (2016) 'Thinking animals without animalism', in S. Blatti and P. Snowdon (eds) <i>Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity</i> . Oxford: Oxford University Press		
11	The Self and the Future	in-campus	Williams, B.A.O. (1970) 'The self and the future', <i>Philosophical Review</i> 79:161-80. Reprinted in B.A.O. Williams (1973) <i>Problems of the Self</i> , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.		
12	Perdurantism	in-campus	Lewis, D. (1986) <i>On The Plurality of Worlds</i> , Oxford: Blackwell, Ch. 4		
13	The Hybrid View	in-campus	Noonan, H, (2021) 'Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way', <i>Metaphysica</i> 22(2), 263-82		

Details of course website

Contact details for teacher(s) or TA(s)

Teacher	
Name:	Prof. Harold Noonan
Office location:	
Telephone:	
Email:	

TA	
Name:	
Office location:	
Telephone:	
Email:	

Academic honesty and plagiarism

Attention is drawn to University policy and regulations on honesty in academic work, and to the disciplinary guidelines and procedures applicable to breaches of such policy and regulations. Details may be found at <http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/policy/academichonesty/>

With each assignment, students will be required to submit a signed declaration that they are aware of these policies, regulations, guidelines and procedures. For group projects, all students of the same group should be asked to sign the declaration.

For assignments in the form of a computer-generated document that is principally text-based and submitted via VeriGuide, the statement, in the form of a receipt, will be issued by the system upon students' uploading of the soft copy of the assignment. Assignments without the receipt will not be graded by teachers. Only the final version of the assignment should be submitted via VeriGuide.