鍾磊

副教授

B.Econ (Renmin); M.Phil (Peking); Ph.D (Michigan)
Rm 424
39437156
leizhong@cuhk.edu.hk
https://sites.google.com/site/philosophyzhong

簡歷

I have obtained a Bachelor’s degree in Economics from Renmin University of China, a Master’s degree in Philosophy from Peking University, and a PhD degree in Philosophy from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. I joined the Department of Philosophy of CUHK in January 2014.

My research interest is divided into two broad areas: 1) philosophy of mind and metaphysics; and 2) moral philosophy and political philosophy. My work has appeared in prestigious philosophy journals. Representative publications include “Sophisticated Exclusion and Sophisticated Causation” (Journal of Philosophy); “Physicalism, Psychism, and Phenomenalism” (Journal of Philosophy); “Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem?” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research); “Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research); “Counterfactuals, Regularity and the Autonomy Approach” (Analysis); “Why the Counterfactualist Should Still Worry About Downward Causation” (Erkenntnis); “Exclusion in Morality” (Grazer Philosophische Studien); “Toward a Demystification of Egalitarianism” (Philosophical Forum); and “A Confucian Virtue Theory of Supererogation” (Philosophy East and West).

My work thus far has stimulated many responses and comments that were published in peer-review journals such as Analysis, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Noûs, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, Ratio, and Synthese. My research is listed in the key works of the ‘Exclusion Problem’ entry on PhilPapers. Some of my articles on mental causation have been translated by others into Chinese.

When not doing philosophy, I enjoy reading traditional Chinese literature, watching American TV series, going to movie theaters, and exploring country parks.

研究範圍

  1. 心靈哲學
  2. 道德哲學
  3. 形上學
  4. 政治哲學
  5. 比較哲學

出版刊物

  1. “Physicalism, Psychism, and Phenomenalism,” Journal of Philosophy (The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.), forthcoming.
  2. “Parallelism Revived (平行主義的復興),” Journal of Dialectics of Nature (Chinese Academy of Sciences), translated into Chinese by Xin Dong, forthcoming.
  3. “Exclusion in Morality,” Grazer Philosophische Studien (Brill), 93(2): 211-226, 2016.
  4. “A Confucian Virtue Theory of Supererogation,” Philosophy East and West (University of Hawai’i Press), 66(1): 328-341, 2016.
  5. “Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Wiley-Blackwell), Online First, DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12231, 2015.
  6. “Why the Counterfactualist Should Still Worry About Downward Causation,” Erkenntnis (Springer), 80(1): 159-171, 2015.
  7. “Sophisticated Exclusion and Sophisticated Causation,” Journal of Philosophy (The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.), 111(7): 341-360, 2014. Translated into Chinese by Yuetao Ding and reprinted in Tsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy (China Social Sciences Press), Volume II, 2016.
  8. “Book Review of Robert Audi’s Moral Perception,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Taylor & Francis), 92(3): 585-587, 2014.
  9. “Internalism, Emotionism, and the Psychopathy Challenge,” Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology (Johns Hopkins University Press), 20(4): 329-337, 2013. With responses from Gwen Adshead and Shaun Gallagher in the same issue.
  10. “Psychopathy, Emotion, and Moral Judgment,” Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology (Johns Hopkins University Press), 20(4): 349-352, 2013.
  11. “Toward a Demystification of Egalitarianism,” Philosophical Forum (Wiley-Blackwell), co-authored with Yingying Tang, 44(2): 149-163, 2013.
  12. “An Explanatory Challenge to Moral Reductionism,” Theoria (Wiley-Blackwell), 78(4): 309-325, 2012.
  13. “Counterfactuals, Regularity and the Autonomy Approach,” Analysis (Oxford University Press), 72(1): 75-85, 2012. With a response from Jonas Christensen and Jesper Kallestrup in the same volume.
  14. “Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Wiley-Blackwell), 83(1): 129-147, 2011.
  15. “A Unificationist Vindication of Moral Explanation,” Philosophical Forum (Wiley-Blackwell), 42(2): 131-146, 2011
  16. “Moral Explanation and Moral Knowledge,” in G. Cheng and N. Xia (eds.), Pluralism: Analytic Philosophy (Shanghai Joint Publishing), 261-282, 2010.