馬庫斯・加布理爾教授
馬庫斯・加布理爾教授
波恩大學教授及知識論、現代與當代哲學講座教授
馬庫斯・加布理爾教授2005年於海德堡大學獲博士學位，2008年獲特許任教資格。2008–2009年，於社會研究新學院擔任哲學助理教授。2009年，獲波恩大學聘為知識論、現代及當代哲學講座教授，是德國史上最年輕的哲學教授；2012年，兼任波恩大學國際哲學中心主任至今；2017年開始，與一位理論核物理學家共同擔任波恩大學科學與思想中心主任，作跨學科研究。2020年，新學院任命加布理爾教授為哲學及新人文科學傑出講師（他也是該校哲學及新人文科學學院的創院主任）。曾於加州柏克萊大學、紐約大學、巴黎索邦大學、里斯本大學、巴勒莫大學以及其他地方擔任訪問職位。
加布理爾教授是第三十位唐君毅訪問教授。他將以「思想的意義──人工智能的限度」為題主持公開演講；之後也會主持本系師生研討會，講題是 “Being Wrong—Subjectivity and Fallibility”。
著作選錄
Der Mensch im Mythos. Untersuchungen über Ontotheologie, Anthropologie und Selbstbewußtseinsgeschichte in Schellings „Philosophie der Mythologie“. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2006.
Skeptizismus und Idealismus in der Antike. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2009.
Why the World does not Exist. Cambridge: Polity Press 2014.
Fields of Sense. A New Realist Ontology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2015.
I am not a Brain: Philosophy of Mind for the 21st Century. Cambridge: Polity Press 2015.
The Limits of Epistemology. Cambridge: Polity Press 2019.
The Meaning of Thought. Cambridge: Polity Press 2020.
Fiktionen. Berlin: Suhrkamp 2020.
思想的意義──人工智能的限度
摘要：
當代許多人工智能的研究，都忽視了其關鍵研究對象的本質：智能。為了填補這方面的不足，我在本演講中試圖提供一個關於智能的本體論述，從而確定人工智能系統在甚麼程度上可以正確地描述為「具備智能」。人工智能的研究，通常着重於智能的「效率」，然後以此屬性與系統可測量的解難能力聯繫起來。通過援引生物學外在論的觀點──根據這個觀點，我們的心智詞彙與生物行為的選擇，在本質上關係密切──我認為，鑒於生物參數（biological
parameters）是關涉問題空間（problem space）的先決條件，因此將心智屬性歸因於非生命系統，在範疇上並不合適。在這個背景下，我認為人工智能系統是「思想」模型，它不應被理解為「能夠思想」的模型：我們有智慧地利用人工智能去解決問題；假若脫離這個背景，而認為有智慧的是人工智能，這實在於理不合。在人工智能系統中，真正具備智能的，其實是一個混合人類和機器的界面，它是由人類使用的技術和人工智能程式所一起構成的。最後，我維
持這個看法：思想本身是一種感覺管道（sense modality），它和與生俱來的、與背景扣連的理解形式息息相關，這些理解形式並不能被任何一種非生物的人工智能系統所取代。
英文主講
歡迎參加
Existence, Non-Existence, Fiction and the Imagination
2月26日 (星期五), 2:30 – 5:15pm, Zoom
3月5日 (星期五), 2:30 – 5:15pm, Zoom
3月12日 (星期五), 2:30 – 5:15pm, Zoom
There are many things: Classrooms, bosons, neurons, numbers, justice, time etc. At the same time, there also seem to be things whose existence can be disputed: values, colors, consciousness, God(s) and so forth. But what exactly are we asserting or denying when we ascribe existence or non- existence to some class of entities? What is it for them to exist or not to exist respectively? Specifically, how is it possible to refer to fictional and imaginary objects (such as literary characters and systematically distorted sensory presentations of ordinary objects of perception, not to mention hallucinated objects) without thereby overturning their alleged ontic status as non-existent? Ever since the founding gesture of philosophy, the concept of being has been threatened by a paradox, most prominently articulated in the Eleatics. The paradox culminates in the conclusion that it is impossible for anything not to be/not to exist in virtue of the fact that any assertion of its non-existence entails its existence qua target of an intentional state directed at the entity or kind of entity charged with non-existence.
In this course, we will look at various formulations of the paradox in order to become acquainted with contemporary strategies of solving or re-solving it by way of ontological theory-construction designed to make sense of assertions both of existence and non-existence alike. In this context, we will discuss the ontology of fictional and imaginary objects, because they can easily be used as litmus tests for the various ontological frameworks on offer in contemporary philosophy with a focus on so-called New Realism.
Being Wrong – Subjectivity and Fallibility
摘要：
We are evidently capable of knowing how things are. In indefinitely many cases, how things are is implicitly or explicitly open to human thought and action. Reality is unconcealed. Yet, by virtue of our very ability to know, we are at the same time aware of the fact that we sometimes get things wrong. We are fallible. In my departmental lecture I will investigate the nature and scope of our fallibility on the basis of an assumption about subjectivity. This subjectivity assumption maintains that to be a fallible thinker means that we are subject to a constitutive and often wide-ranging ignorance as to which of our beliefs are actually true and which false. To be a subject is to be wrong about some things without ever being in a position to settle once and for all which of our beliefs are non-accidentally true (and thereby constitute knowledge) and which of our actions are morally good.
In my lecture, I will argue that human subjects are not only fallible knowers, capable of getting things right or wrong. Rather, what constitutes our individual perspective on reality (including on our individual perspective, which also belongs to what there is), is the fact that we are never in a position to set our epistemic record straight once and for all. We cannot replace all our false beliefs with true ones. To be someone is thus to be a bearer of false beliefs many of which remain undetected. If we had only true beliefs, we would merge with reality. Being and thought would form an indissoluble whole. Thus, being someone puts us at a partial distance from what there is, a distance which itself belongs to what there is. In light of these considerations, I will propose an epistemic account of reality according to which the category reality is essentially tied to our self-portrait as fallible thinkers. This will shed new light on the issue of realism in epistemology and ontology.
英文主講
歡迎參加