News and Events

Not Being Sure of Myself (Departmental Seminar)

Joining the Seminar face-to-face:
Limited seats for face-to-face seminar. Registrations will be handled on a first come, first served basis.
Register by 8 April 2024: https://cloud.itsc.cuhk.edu.hk/webform/view.php?id=13686128

Joining the Seminar online:
No registration is required.
Link: https://cuhk.zoom.us/j/97262094533
Meeting ID: 972 6209 4533

Tel: 3943 7135
Email: philosophy@cuhk.edu.hk


It’s intuitive to think that an intentional action requires that the agent knows that she’s doing so. In light of some apparent counterexamples, Setiya suggests that this intuitive insight is better captured in terms of credence: performing an intentional action requires the agent to have a higher credence that she’s doing so than she would have otherwise. I argue that there is no such thing as an agent’s credence for what she’s doing. After distinguishing this thesis from an idea some defend under the slogan “deliberation crowds out prediction”, I explore the thesis’s broader epistemological implications for the belief-credence relation.

Delivered in English.
All are welcome.